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Comment
Dead Man Talking:
A New Approach to the
Post-Mortem Attorney-Client Privilege
Erick S. Ottoson*
Seven employees of the White House travel office were fired
abruptly in May, 1993, over alleged financial mismanagement.'
A subsequent congressional inquiry into the matter uncovered
evidence linking First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton to the
firings.2 Though Mrs. Clinton denied any connection to the
decision to terminate the employees, a high-ranking White
House official claimed that the First Lady had ordered the firings
directly.3 Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr was brought in
to investigate Mrs. Clintones connection to the matter, including
claims that she cleared out the office in order to award the lu-
crative travel contracts4 to personal associates.5
A key figure in the investigation was Vincent Foster, Jr., a
White House deputy counsel and Hillary Clinton's former private
attorney.6 Foster, who was thought to have direct knowledge of
Mrs. Clinton's involvement in the firings,7 committed suicide in
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 1996,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I thank Professor Michael Paulsen
for his guidance and support.
L See Michael Y. Frisby, Clinton Fires White House Travel Office, FBI
Is Probing Allegations of Kickbacks, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1993, at A5.
2. See Whitewater Probers Closer to Getting Notes on Travel Office Fir-
ings, Cm. TRIE., Aug. 30, 1997, at 14.
3. See Michael Isikoff & Bill Turque, Snow Job?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22,
1996, at 30-31.
4. The travel office coordinates travel arrangements, including commer-
cial flights, for the White House staff and press corps accompanying the
President on trips. See Frisby, supra note 1, at A5.
5. See First Lady Faces Travel Office Questions, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb.
17, 1996, at 5A, available in 1996 WL 2335127.
6. See Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, Why Vince Foster Died,
NEWSWEEK, July 11, 1994, at 17.
7. Foster had reportedly instigated an FBI probe into travel office fi-
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July 1993.8 In early 1997, pursuant to the ongoing investigation,
Starr obtained a subpoena for notes of a conversation between
the deceased Foster9 and his civilian attorney, James Hamil-
ton.'" A federal district court, in secret proceedings, held that
the attorney-client privilege shielded the communications from
subpoena." On appeal, Starr argued that Foster's death ren-
dered the privilege inapplicable to the communications at issue.'2
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed, and re-
versed the lower court's ruling in In re Sealed Case,'3 stating
that the privilege "should not automatically apply" in all circum-
stances.'4
The decision in Sealed Case departs significantly from the
common law rule regarding post-mortem application of the
attorney-client privilege. Courts have generally been reluctant
to carve out exceptions to the privilege, and outside of certain
narrow circumstances,' 5 have uniformly held that its protection
extends indefinitely after the death of the client.'6 By contrast,
the court in Sealed Case described a "discrete realm" in which
circumstances may allow a court to strip away the protective
cloak of the privilege and compel disclosure of attorney-client
communications.'7 Despite the court's attempt to narrowly cir-
cumscribe the scope of its holding,'" the decision in Sealed Case
has the potential to significantly diminish the scope of post-
mortem privilege, and thereby to affect the flow of information
between clients and attorneys.
nances at Mrs. Clinton's request. See id.
8. See id.
9. Mr. Foster's diary contained references to Mrs. Clinton's role in the
firings. See id.
10. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Hamilton, a
partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Swidler & Berlin, took the notes
when he met with Foster to discuss legal representation. See Marcia Coyle,
Does Death End Client's Privilege?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1998, at AT.
1L See id.
12. See id.
13. 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The U.S. Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, No. 97-1192, 1998 WL
138963 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1998). See generally Coyle, supra note 10, at A7.
14. Id. at 234.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 73-76.
16. See Simon J. Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of
the Client, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 45, 46-47 (1992).
17. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 234.
18. See infra Part H (discussing the court's holding and rationale).
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This Comment argues that the court in Sealed Case correctly
concluded that certain circumstances justify departure from
the strictures of the common law rule, but failed in its decision
to adequately safeguard the interests protected by the privilege.
Part I briefly describes the attorney-client privilege and its under-
lying rationale, and examines existing exceptions to the privi-
lege. Part H outlines the court's holding and reasoning in
Sealed Case. Part Ill analyzes the balancing test articulated
by the court in Sealed Case in light of the underlying rationale
for the attorney-client privilege. This Comment concludes that
the standard articulated in Sealed Case was neither suffi-
ciently narrow nor adequately defined. Part IV proposes in its
stead a new exception to the privilege. This new exception,
which is predicated on a showing of a conspiracy involving the
decedent, will allow future courts access to information under
appropriate compelling circumstances while providing maxi-
mum protection for the interests served by the attorney-client
privilege.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: THE RULE AND
ITS EXCEPTIONS
A. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege "seal[s] the lips of an attorney
as to communications with [a] client."19 While the wording and
precise contours of the rule differ among jurisdictions," modern
19. Frankel, supra note 16, at 46.
20. Most states have codified the privilege. See Frankel, supra note 16, at 55
n.52 ("While most states have codified the attorney-client privi-
lege ... interpretation of the scope and application of the privilege in most
areas continues to be an arena of common law interpretation, with court-
fashioned exceptions regularly read into statutory privilege provisions.");
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney.Client
Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1064 (1978) ('ihe law of attorney-client
privilege is the product of judicial decisions, augmented by statutes that
usually incorporate the decisional law.").
Until the 1970s, privilege law "var[ied] widely from state to state." Devel-
opments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450,
1462 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications]. In 1974, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a revised
version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which laid out a new version of the
attorney-client privilege. See id. at 1462-63. "[W]idespread acceptance of the
[revised rules] has reduced the discrepancies between states' privilege laws."
Id. at 1463.
Application of the privilege in federal courts is controlled by Federal Rule
1998] 1331
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formulations generally afford a client permanent control over
the disclosure of his or her communications with a legal advisor.21
The early history of the privilege is somewhat hazy.n Official
references to the rule first appear in English decisions as early
as the late Sixteenth Century.u Courts initially characterized
the privilege as "a protection for the honor of the attorney,"2
of Evidence 501, enacted in 1975. The rule provides, "the privilege of a wit-
ness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts... in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID. 501. Federal
courts applying state substantive law must apply state law privilege princi-
ples. See id. See generally Privileged Communications, supra, at 1463-70
(discussing the history of the revised federal evidentiary rules).
21. The most well-known and oft-quoted formulation of the rule belongs
to Wigmore:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (John T. McNaughton ed.,
1961). For another commonly cited version of the rule, see United States v.
United Shoe Machine Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
The attorney's ethical obligation to protect client confidences, which is
distinguishable from the attorney-client privilege, is codified separately in
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The rule states simply
that a lawyer "shall not reveal information relating to representation of a cli-
ent." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). On the
whole, professional ethics codes "vary in their edicts, ranging from nearly ab-
solute prohibitions on attorney disclosures to general rules containing signifi-
cant exceptions." Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L.
REv. 351, 352 (1989).
22. See Hazard, supra note 20, at 1070 ("Taken as a whole, the historical
record is not authority for a broadly stated rule of privilege or confidence.");
Brian R. Hood, The Attorney-Client Privilege and a Revised Rule 1.6: Permit-
ting Limited Disclosure After the Death of the Client, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
741, 759 (1994) (discussing the privilege's "ambiguous historical pedigree,"
and noting that "its historical justifications and limits have been disputed re-
cently"); Privileged Communications, supra note 20, at 1502 ("Historians do
not agree on why courts originally granted a privilege for attorney-client
communications."). See generally Hazard, supra note 20, at 1070-91 (tracing
the development of the privilege from the Seventeenth Century in England
through the Nineteenth Century in America).
23. See Privileged Communications, supra note 20, at 1456. The attorney-
client privilege was the first evidentiary privilege recognized, followed by the
spousal privilege, which emerged by the late 1600s. See id.
24. See Frankel, supra note 16, at 49 (explaining that, by protecting attor-
neys from being forced to disclose others' confidences, the privilege was
thought to safeguard the "gentlemanly" status of members of the legal pro-
fession); Hazard, supra note 20, at 1070 (same); Alvin K Hellerstein, A Com-
prehensive Survey of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine,
in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 1996, at 589, 607 (PLI
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and only later came to view it as "belonging to" the client .2 A
version similar to the modern formulation crystallized in the
United States and England by the middle of last century.26
Courts have nearly universally held that the privilege
against compelled disclosure extends indefinitely after the
death of the client. The views of legal scholars have not been
quite as uniform; a few have argued vehemently for the tradi-
tional rule,u but most have supported some degree of post-
mortem diminishment of the privilege under certain compelling
circumstances.29 Nonetheless, except in cases involving disputes
between survivors claiming under the decedent's estate, 0 the
death of the client has not in itself been viewed as an inde-
pendent reason for abrogating the privilege.
B. WHY THE PRiVILEGE?
The settled rationale behind the attorney-client privilege is
that it promotes honest and complete disclosure by clients and
thereby serves the public's interest in competent legal repre-
sentation." Without the guarantee of confidentiality, clients
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 540, 1996) (same).
25. Only the client may waive the privilege. See generally infra text ac-
companying notes 59-63 (discussing waiver of the privilege); see also Heller-
stein, supra note 24, at 607.
26. See Frankel, supra note 16, at 48-49.
27. See id. at 46-47, 55-57. The most notorious recent case to so hold was
In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990). The
facts of Doe highlight the traditional weight accorded the privilege, even after
the death of the client. Three months after Carol DiMaiti Stuart was fatally
shot, her brother-in-law came forward with information implicating himself
and the deceased's husband in the homicide. See Frances M. Jewels, Com-
ment, Evidence-Attorney-Client Privilege Survives Client's Death-In re
John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 562 N.E.2d 69 (1990), 25
SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 1260, 1260-61 (1991). Charles Stuart, the alleged victim's
husband, thereafter took his own life hours after meeting with his attorney.
See id. at 1261. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to allow
the state to compel the attorney to reveal the content of his communications
with Charles Stuart, despite the ongoing criminal investigation into the
brother-in-law's involvement. See 562 N.E.2d at 71-72.
28. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 16, at 48, 58-79 (arguing that, outside of
situations involving the established testamentary exception, the rule should
consistently protect client communications even after death).
29. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EviDENcE § 94 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d
ed. 1984); CHARLEs W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.3, at 256 (1986);
24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAMm, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 5498, at 484-86 (1986).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 73-76 (discussing the testamentary
exception).
31. See generally Privileged Communications, supra note 20, at 1472-74.
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would hesitate to reveal embarrassing or damaging facts, and
attorneys would be forced to render legal advice and services
based on partial knowledge of clients' situations. By providing
attorneys with all of the information needed to provide compe-
tent representation, the privilege is thought to promote greater
accuracy in the truthfinding process, 32 despite the fact that it
blocks the factfinder's access to potentially relevant evidence.33
Under this utilitarian framework, without some specific com-
pelling reason to compel disclosure, it makes sense to extend
the privilege after the death of the client, since clients are more
likely, on average, to be frank with their attorneys when assured
of continuing confidentiality.
The privilege also protects the privacy interests of those
who seek legal representation by ensuring that third parties do
not gain access to clients' personal information." The privacy
rationale assumes that persons have an interest in protecting
their reputation, even after death, by controlling the flow of infor-
mation concerning their intimate affairs.3s The privilege thus
serves society's interest in preserving individuals' dignity and
autonomy.
Courts articulating rationales for the attorney-client
privilege have generally accorded privacy interests less weight
than utilitarian concerns.36 Although this has led some com-
The Supreme Court has embraced the utilitarian rationale, stating that the
purpose of the privilege is "to encourage full and frank communication be-
tween attorneys and their clients." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389 (1981); accord United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 401 F. Supp.
361, 363 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
"Three assumptions form the basis of this rationale: the assumption that
clients need to consult lawyers, the assumption that lawyers need all the facts
to adequately deal with clients' matters, and the assumption that clients
would not disclose information without the privilege's promise of confidential-
ity." Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Rep.
resenting Corporations, 48 MERcER L. REv. 1169, 1176 (1997).
32. See Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitar-
ian World: An Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1697, 1699(1995). Encouraging frank disclosure by clients also promotes compliance
with increasingly complex laws. See id.
33. See Privileged Communications, supra note 20, at 1473.
34. See id. at 1480-83 (discussing the privacy rationale).
35. See id. at 1481.
36. Judicial opinions infrequently discuss explicitly the privacy or "rights-
based" justifications for the rule. See Giesel, supra note 31, at 1179-80 (stating
that modern courts have not explicitly relied on the privacy rationale). But see
Frankel, supra note 16, at 53 n.41 (cataloguing various cases in which courts
have explicitly addressed the privacy rationale behind the privilege).
1334 [Vol. 82:1329
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mentators to announce the death of the rights-based justification
for the privilege,3 7 privacy concerns remain inescapably enmeshed
with the utilitarian rationale. Because rational clients will weigh
such concerns when deciding whether to disclose information,
the rules of privilege must take privacy interests into account if
they are to facilitate frank communication with attorneys.38
At least two "political" arguments have also been advanced
by scholars to explain the privilege, both of which frame the
rule as something other than a principled attempt to protect
individual freedoms or to safeguard the accuracy of court pro-
ceedings. The first of these characterizes the privilege as a tool
of the powerful, a means of allowing the wealthy to maintain a
veil of secrecy around their activities so as to avoid loosening
their stranglehold on power and resources.39  The second de-
scribes the privilege as a way of enhancing the image of the legal
system.' According to this view, by safeguarding certain com-
munications between clients and attorneys, the privilege prevents
society from viewing courts as despotic juggernauts, and pre-
vents the emergence of information after the fact that might
undermine the credibility of the factfinding process.4'
Although the Constitution is often absent from scholarly
debate over the privilege, the rule can have significant consti-
tutional underpinnings. In the criminal context, information
conveyed to an attorney by a potential defendant is protected
against compelled disclosure only if it falls within the scope of
the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination-in
37. See, e.g., Note, supra note 32, at 1705 (explaining how the rights-
based argument "gradually sank from view" and "no longer animates discus-
sions of the attorney-client privilege).
38. See Privileged Communications, supra note 20, at 1483-86 (describing
the privacy rationale as "supplementary" to the traditional justification and
concluding that "both [are] really instrumental approaches that differ only
in... focus, respectively, on the direct and the indirect consequences of com-
pelling testimony").
39. See id. at 1493-94.
40. See fd. at 1498-1500.
41. See id. This argument is sometimes framed as a Kantian "categorical
imperative":
Underlying the categorical imperative argument for the privilege is
the premise that a trusting lawyer-client relationship is itself the
chief value inherent in the confidentiality principle. This is so not
because the privilege leads to better lawyering, but because it en-
hances client autonomy and gives clients a sense that the legal sys-
tem is capable of fair play.
Hood, supra note 22, at 761.
1998] 1335
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other words, if the client could not have been forced to reveal
the information prior to disclosing it to the attorney.42 The
Fifth Amendment only bars the use of incriminating information
in a criminal proceeding against the person from whom it was
obtained, however, and does not erect a per se barrier to the
state's obtaining the information. 43 Thus, disclosure by an at-
torney might be constitutionally permissible if the defendant is
granted immunity.' The privilege also implicates the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.45  Compel-
ling disclosure of client confidences can threaten this right by
preventing the free flow of information from client to attorney
and by forcing an attorney to become a witness against a client.'
42. See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Con-fidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1121-22 (1985) (discussing
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)). But see Lee A. Pizzimenti, The
Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U.
L. REV. 441, 451 (1990) ("Despite some scholarly commentary to the contrary,
it is unlikely that a lawyer's disclosure of future crimes or perjury implicates
any constitutional rights.").
43. See Subin, supra note 42, at 1125.
44. Subin concludes: "When a demand is made of an attorney to disclose
privileged communications, the defendanefs fifth amendment rights may bejeopardized.... [A] court should not permit disclosure in the absence of a
constitutionally adequate immunity provision. The invocation of such a pro-
vision would, however, resolve the self-incrimination problem." Id. at 1132.
45. See id. at 1127. The right of access to counsel "encompasses both the
sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal cases and the fourteenth
amendment due process right to counsel in civil cases." Id.
46. See id. at 1128. Subin describes two prongs of the right-to-counsel
argument:
First, the right to counsel requires that incriminating communica-
tions from the client to the attorney be considered privileged, and
therefore nondiscloseable. Second, whether privileged or not, per-
mitting or requiring the lawyer to disclose such information renders
it impossible for the attorney to provide effective representation, ei-
ther because it destroys the cliens trust in the attorney, or because
it puts the attorney in the intolerable position of being a witness
against the client.
Id. The first argument is unconvincing because "[t]he right to counsel may be
violated by compelled disclosure of privileged information, but only because
such information is related to the attorney's professional task of providing le-
gal advice, and not because it may be incriminating." Id. at 1129. The pri-
mary limitation of the second Sixth Amendment rationale is this: because the
Constitution merely guarantees the right to effective counsel, and not to rep-
resentation by any particular attorney, the principle would not be violated if a
court assigned new counsel to a defendant whose original attorney was re-
quired to reveal confidences. See id. at 1130-31.
1336 [Vol. 82:1329
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The last few decades have witnessed extensive debate over
the proper scope of the privilege.47 Much of this debate is really
a debate over the appropriate reasons to have such a privilege
at all, since the differing rationales suggest different formulations
of the rule.' Courts and commentators do agree that the
privilege should be defined in such a way as to shield no more
information than necessary from the eye of the factfinder. After
all, the device "inevitably excludes potentially relevant infor-
mation from the consideration of the finder of fact,"49 and thus
has the potential to impair the functioning of courts."
C. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE
Despite debate over the proper scope of the attorney-client
privilege, courts have been reluctant to establish any general
judicial discretionary authority to waive the privilege when a
balancing of the relevant interests51 indicates that abrogation
of the privilege is justified.52 Courts reason that only a test
47. See id. at 1095 (describing a "far-ranging" debate over legal ethics and
noting that issues of attorney loyalty and confidentiality have dominated this
debate); Hazard, supra note 20, at 1067-68 ("There are respectable and vocif-
erous supporters of the proposition that anything a lawyer learns about his
client ought to.be secret, maybe even including the clientis intention to have
the lawyer cooperate in [the] exercise [of] perjury.").
48. See Privileged Communications, supra note 20, at 1486 ("The ration-
ale used to justify a privilege plays an important role in debates about what
form that privilege should take."); Hazard, supra note 20, at 1062 (stating
that the real issue in the debate "is not whether [the privilege] should exist,
but precisely what its terms should be").
49. Frankel, supra note 16, at 49; see also Privileged Communications,
supra note 20, at 1454 ("Unlike other rules of evidence, privileges are not
fashioned primarily to exclude unreliable evidence or otherwise to aid in the
truth-seeking function. Indeed... privileges expressly subordinate the goal
of truth seeking to other societal interests.").
50. Not surprisingly, courts generally disfavor privileges that allow any-
one to conceal relevant information from judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Jaffee
v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1996). The Court quotes the maxim that
"the public... has a right to every man's evidence," and explains that excep-
tions to this rule can only be justified by a public need that outweighs 'the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
the truth.'" Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33 (discussing the interests
served by the privilege).
52. See, ag., Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (recognizing a patient-psychotherapist
privilege, but refusing to adopt a balancing approach allowing abrogation of
the privilege where trial judge later determined that evidentiary need for
disclosure outweighed patient's interest in privacy); In re John Doe Grand
Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 71 (Mass. 1990) (refusing to adopt a rule
allowing abrogation of the privilege when society's interest in the truth out-
1998] 1337
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that ensures predictability will adequately protect the interests
served by the privilege, since clients will be less likely to disclose
incriminating or embarrassing information if they are unsure
whether the court may later force the attorney to reveal that
information in a judicial proceeding.53 While a number of pro-
posed "balancing tests" have been advanced over the years, 4
none has proven concrete enough to satisfy courts and com-
mentators that its implementation would result in uniform
application.55
Despite powerful theoretical arguments for retaining a
near-absolute privilege, the empirical assumptions underlying
the rule are less than settled.56 Proponents of the balancing
weighed the harm caused by disclosure).
53. See Giesel, supra note 31, at 1173 ("For the privilege to encourage client
disclosure to counsel, a high degree of certainty must exist that the privilege
will protect what the client says from disclosure in the event litigation ensues.").
54. See, e.g., Jaffee, 116 S. Ct at 1932; Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 71; infra note
88 (discussing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)).
55. A number of commentators have advanced arguments in support of
the balancing approach, calling for abrogation of the privilege in certain com-
pelling circumstances. The typical "compelling situation" is one in which an
attorney knows that disclosure of certain information conveyed by the client is
the only way to prevent harm or death to another person, but has been sworn
to secrecy by the client. See, e.g., Hood, supra note 22, at 741-42 (posing a hy-
pothetical in which an attorney finds herself unable to disclose a clienfs con-
fession to committing a crime for which an innocent person has already been
convicted and sentenced to death); Subin, supra note 42, at 1101-06(advancing a hypothetical based on the famous "Buried Bodies" case, in which
an attorney remained silent despite his knowledge of the location of a dis-
membered victim's remains); Zacharias, supra note 21, at 352 (discussing a
hypothetical in which an attorney learns from a client, who is not implicated
in the crime, the location of a kidnapping victim); cf. STEPHEN GILLERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAw AND ETHICS 28-30 (4th ed. 1995)(discussing the attorney's ethical, rather than legal, obligations, and posing
the following hypotheticals: (1) an attorney learns that a client has AIDS, and
that the client lives with a woman who is unaware of his condition; (2) an at-
torney learns that her client has hidden a handgun in a police car in a location
not likely to be discovered by the police but easily accessible to anyone ar-
rested and placed in the rear of the vehicle; (3) an attorney has a strong in-
tuition that one of his clients is planning to commit suicide). See generally
Kathryn W. Tate, The Hypothetical as a Tool for Teaching the Lawyer's Duty
of Confidentiality, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1659 (1996).
56. See Privileged Communications, supra note 20, at 1474-80 (discussing
the difficulty of ascertaining empirically the potential deterrent effect of
abolishing the privilege); Giesel, supra note 31, at 1172, 1181-82 & n.46-48(listing several studies that have attempted to document the effect of the
privilege, and concluding that "[nione have [sic] produced forceful results.");
Subin, supra note 42, at 1163 ("The conclusion that confidentiality is essential
to adequate representation rests upon the premise that without it clients
would not disclose all the facts that the attorney needs to know to perform
1338 [Vol. 82:1329
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approach suggest that in many, if not most cases, an exception
allowing for disclosure in limited circumstances would make no
real difference to clients, and that the normal lawyer-client
relationship would thus go unaffected.57 A strict rule against
nondisclosure in all circumstances, they argue, unnecessarily
adheres to the theoretical justifications behind the privilege
and ignores the practical benefits of allowing such disclosure."
Despite the general tendency to retain a nearly absolute
attorney-client privilege, courts have recognized exceptions to
the privilege in a few limited sets of circumstances, including
cases of waiver by the client, cases in which a client seeks or
uses legal advice in furtherance of a crime or fraud, and testa-
mentary disputes. In addition, third parties may be able in some
instances to compel disclosure of a client's conversations with
an attorney when suing the attorney over a matter in which he
or she represented the client, or, according to a recently estab-
lished rule, when the third party is the executive branch of the
federal government, seeking to compel disclosure of communi-
cations made to government attorneys. Each of these excep-
tions is justifiable in light of the utilitarian justification for the
privilege, either because it allows the client to retain some meas-
ure of control over the release of confidential information, or be-
cause it operates on communications that lie outside the scope of
proper attorney-client communications.
1. Waiver: The attorney-client privilege may be waived by
client consent.59 For a waiver to be valid, the client must waive
the privilege knowingly and intelligently.6" The existence of
waiver authority does not threaten clients' willingness to disclose,
and thus does not undermine the attorney-client privilege; it is
competently. But that premise lacks empirical support. Little data exists,
and that which does exist is at best inconclusive."); Frankel, supra note 16, at
61 ("The available empirical evidence... tells us little about the degree to
which people are concerned with protection against disclosure, either before
or after they die, when they confide in an attorney."); Note, supra note 32, at
1702 (referring to a "lack of empirical study devoted to the benefits and costs
of the privilege).
57. See, e.g., Subin, supra note 42, at 1163-64.
58. See id.
59. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAw AND ETHICS
OF LAWYERING 271-72 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing waiver). According to one
commentator, courts "frequently circumvent [the privilege]" after the death of
the client by finding that the client waived the privilege. Denise P. Lindberg,
The Accountant-Client Privilege: Does It and Should It Survive the Death of
the Client?, 1987 BYU L. REV. 1271, 1276 (1987) (referring to the attorney-
client privilege).
60. See Hellerstein, supra note 24, at 814.
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simply an outgrowth of the rule that the privilege belongs to
the client." While there are limitations on clients' ability to
dictate the scope of waiver,62 in general the client dictates
which information is privileged and which is revealed.63
2. The crime-fraud exception: Generally speaking, "[a] client
who has sought assistance for the purpose of committing a
crime or fraud... cannot require secrecy."' The "crime or
fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege operates when
a client reveals an intention to commit an act proscribed by law
to his or her attorney, or when a client takes advantage of legal
advice to advance a fraudulent or criminal plan.65 The excep-
61. A client may waive the privilege expressly, or impliedly through con-
duct, for example "by disclosure of any part of the information to a third
party, production of privileged documents, deposition testimony, or the use of
legal advice for business purposes." Thomas W. Hyland & Molly Hood Craig,
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in the Corporate Setting,
62 DEF. COUNS. J. 553, 554 (1995). A court may also find implied waiver
when a client knowingly allows an attorney to reveal privileged information
without taking steps to prevent the disclosure. See, e.g., In re Claus von Bu-
low, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
62. Any conduct by the client which is inconsistent with maintaining the
privilege-for example, failing to invoke the privilege in response to another's
attempt to gain access to confidential communications-will result in a find-
ing of waiver. See HAZARD, supra note 59, at 271-72. In addition, an attorney
may possess implied authority to waive the privilege. See id. at 272. In a liti-
gation context, a client who selectively reveals portions of confidential conver-
sations in order to bolster his or her case cannot maintain a veil of secrecy
over the damaging or prejudicial portions of those same conversations. See,
e.g., von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 102-03 (discussing this rule and noting various
cases in which it has been applied).
63. See HAZARD, supra note 59, at 271-72.
64. David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the At-
torney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV.
443, 443 (1986); see also Ann M. St. Peter-Griffith, Abusing the Privilege: The
Crime-Fraud Exception to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 259, 263 (1993) (stating that the exception "proscribes the per-
petuation of a crime or fraud under the pretext of privilege"). See generally
Privileged Communications, supra note 20, at 1509-14 (discussing the excep-
tion).
65. See Fried, supra note 64, at 443-44. The latter case includes both in-
stances in which the client seeks legal advice-with a previously formed inten-
tion to commit an illegal act, and in which the client forms the intention only
after obtaining advice, i.e., upon learning that his or her plan cannot be car-
ried out by legal means. See id. at 444; St. Peter-Griffith, supra note 64, at
263. See generally Rachel A. Hutzel, Evidence: The Crime Fraud Exception to
Attorney-Client Privilege-United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (interim ed.
1989), 15 U. DANTON L. REV. 365, 372-73 (1990) (describing scenarios in which
the exception applies). The crime-fraud exception was first announced une-
quivocally in the English case Regina v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884), and there-
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tion generally does not apply to past wrongdoings that a client
reveals to an attorney.'
The crime-fraud exception is based on the notion that
communications made in furtherance of an illegal purpose do
not fall within the purview of the attorney-client relationship,
because it is not part of an attorney's professional role to further
illegal activity.67 No attorney-client privilege can ever exist for
such communications, because the privilege only applies to
communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal counsel
from an attorney acting in a professional capacity.
68
The crime-fraud exception presents vexing procedural is-
sues. Courts have struggled to create a method of applying the
exception that balances the need to protect legitimately privi-
leged information with the need for access to communications
after caught on quickly in the United States. See Fried, supra note 64, at 456,
459; Christopher Paul Galanek, The Impact of the Zolin Decision on the
Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 24 GA. L. REV. 1115,
1123 (1990). While the Cox decision seemed to limit the exception to cases in
which the client had an unlawful intent at the time of the consultation, subse-
quent cases have applied the rule to clients who form this intent after obtain-
ing the advice of counsel. See Fried, supra note 64, at 459. See generally
Hellerstein, supra note 24, at 665-718 (reviewing the crime-fraud exception).
The Uniform Rules of Evidence state that no attorney-client privilege ex-
ists "[i]f the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid
anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably
should have known to be a crime or fraud." UNIF. R. EVID. 502(d)(1). For an
explanation of the role of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, see supra note 20.
66. See St. Peter-Griffith, supra note 64, at 263. The exception might
apply to such a statement if it was made with an illegal purpose in mind. See
Subin, supra note 42, at 1117. Conversely, not every statement that relates to
a future crime or fraud necessarily implicates the exception, since a client
must actually use the advice obtained to further an illegal purpose. See id.;
see also David S. Rudolf & Thomas K. Maher, Attorney-Client Privilege May
Protect Discussions of Future Criminal Activity, CHAMPION, April 1997, at 41,
41-42 (discussing a recent Massachusetts case in which the defendant's disclo-
sure of his plan to commit arson was held privileged and inadmissible after
his attorney revealed the plan to the police).
67. See Kendall C. Dunson, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 231, 232 (1996).
68. See Subin, supra note 42, at 1117-18; Hazard, supra note 20, at 1063-
64 (arguing that "if the client has in mind anything but a 'legithnate' purpose
in consulting a lawyer, it might be said that communications between them
are neither 'in the course of the attorney-client relationship nor in
'professional' confidence"). It is sometimes stated that in such a situation, no
attorney-client relationship exists at all. See, e.g., Hutzel, supra note 65, at
371 (discussing the court's conclusion in Cox that "if a client seeks an attor-
ney's aid in the commission of a crime or fraud... there is no professional
relationship between the attorney and the client").
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made in furtherance of illegal activity. 9 The problem lies in
determining what quantity and what type of evidence is
needed to defeat the privilege." Generally speaking, a party
seeking to invoke the exception must make some initial showing
of illegality, a burden sometimes characterized as "some foun-
dation in fact."7' A party seeking to compel disclosure via the
crime-fraud exception need not introduce independent evidence of
illegality, but instead may use the communications at issue as the
basis for invoking the exception, provided they introduce evidence
supporting a reasonable belief that in camera review will uncover
evidence that establishes the exception's applicability.72
3. The testamentary exception: Another, more limited ex-
ception abrogates the privilege after the death of the client for
the limited purpose of resolving disputes between persons
claiming under the decedent's estate.73 This "testamentary"
exception is based on the notion that revealing information
needed to resolve such disputes effectuates the deceased cli-
ent's wishes by ensuring that assets are distributed according
to his or her wishes.74 The privilege is not stripped away en-
tirely in such a scenario, however, because the communications
are only discoverable by persons with a legitimate stake in the
deceased's property, and only in the case of a dispute.75 Appli-
cation of the testamentary exception, therefore, is in a sense
69. The Court in Cox succinctly stated the problem: The secret must be told
in order to see whether it ought to be kept." 14 Q.B.D. at 175; see also Hutzel,
supra note 65, at 365 ("[Tlhe need for the fact-finder to have access to relevant
information directly conflicts with the near-sanctity accorded the attorney-client
privilege.").
70. See Galanek, supra note 65, at 1124; see also Hutzel, supra note 65, at
373. Particularly, the following questions have defined this debate: "(1) What
quantum of evidence is necessary to overcome the presumption in favor of the
confidentiality of attorney-client communications? (2) Can the communication
itself serve as the necessary evidence? (3) If so, should the determination be
made by the judge after an in camera examination of the communication?"
Fried, supra note 64, at 461.
71. See Fried, supra note 64, at 462; Hutzel, supra note 65, at 374; St. Pe-
ter-Griffith, supra note 64, at 265. The initial formulation required a "prima
facie" showing of illegality in order to compel disclosure. See Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1932).
72. See St. Peter-Griffith, supra note 64, at 269 (discussing United States
v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989)).
73. See generally Frankel, supra note 16, at 73-78 (discussing the testa-
mentary exception and its justifications).
74. See id. at 76-77.
75. See id.
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controlled by the client, since it depends on the client's wishes
expressed prior to death. 6
4. The attorney self-defense exception: The attorney-client
privilege also may not apply in suits against attorneys in which
the attorney must discuss client communications in order to
present an adequate defense.7 The self-defense exception,
which arose in America in the 1800s, originally applied only
"[to] situations in which the attorney and client [were] in an
adversarial posture. "" It has since been extended to include
situations in which the attorney is sued or prosecuted by a
third party.79
Disclosure in attorney self-defense cases, at least in suits
brought by third parties, has disturbing implications. In the
case of a suit brought by the client against the attorney, the
goal of the privilege is not likely to be undermined, because a
client who feels that the costs of disclosure outweigh the po-
tential benefits of bringing a suit can simply avoid disclosure
by not bringing the suit. Suits brought by third parties, on the
other hand, offer the client no such option, and thus pose a risk
of chilling client communications, especially given the risk that
a third party will bring a suit against an attorney as a pretext
for garnering information for use in a suit against the client."0
In principle, at least, the danger posed by third-party lawsuits
is minimized by the fact that courts limit the release of privi-
leged information to that which is "necessary" to the attorney's
defense."'
76. See id.
77. See Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 449-50 n.31.
78. Jennifer Cunningham, Note, Eliminating Backdoor Access to Client
Confidences: Restricting the Self-Defense Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992, 1009 (1990). Traditionally, the rule operated
"when an attorney was sued for malpractice... brought suit to recover a fee,
or... was charged with misconduct in the course of litigation between a cli-
ent.., and another party." Id. at 1008 (footnotes omitted). In such cases the
client was generally said to have impliedly waived the privilege by making the
accusations against the attorney. See id. at 1008-09.
79. See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); Cunningham, supra note 78,
at 1010-15 (discussing Meyerhofer); see also id. at 992-93, 1010-20 (describing
the emergence of the exception for suits involving third parties).
80. See Cunningham, supra note 78, at 1021 (noting the potential for this
form of abuse).
81. See id. at 1009-10. However, courts have not always adhered to this
requirement in practice. See id. at 1010, 1015-17 (discussing cases in which
courts have allowed the exception to operate without a showing of necessity,
and noting that "there seem to be few, if any, cases in which a court has de-
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5. The "Government Entity" exception: The most recently
established exception to the attorney-client privilege is closely
related to the crime-fraud exception. 2 In a divided opinion, an
Eighth Circuit court recently held that a White House official
cannot invoke the privilege as to conversations with a govern-
ment attorney, at least in the context of a federal criminal investi-
gation.83 The decision rested primarily on the idea that the
government's criminal justice needs outweigh its own need for
confidentiality,84 and that allowing officials to use their gov-
ernment attorneys as a shield was a "misuse of public assets."85
Thus, the White House attorneys, as employees of the federal
government, could not assert the privilege in the face of re-
quests for disclosure by agents of that same government. 6
Despite these exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, only
one of which is tied directly to the cient's death, 7 courts have gen-
erally disfavored attempts to diminish the scope of the privilege,
and have particularly avoided adopting exceptions that do not
contain sufficiently concrete guidelines to ensure their uniform
and predictable application.88 Because the Sealed Case exception
is of the "balancing test" variety which has heretofore been
shunned as unworkable, the decision bears examination.
nied an attorney's request to invoke the exception"); id. at 1023 (noting a lack
of procedural and substantive controls to guide courts in applying the self-
defense exception).
82. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
83. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 915 (8th
Cir. 1997). The decision arose essentially out of the same set of facts as
Sealed Case, but involved Mrs. Clinton's communications with her govern-
ment attorneys.
84. See id. at 920-21.
85. See id. at 921.
86. See id.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76 (discussing the testamen-
tary exception).
88. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), is emblematic of this
reluctance on the part of the judiciary. In Upjohn, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down the "control group" test, which had allowed for compelled disclo-
sure of communications made to attorneys by any members of a corporation
who had no significant decisionmaking authority in the organization. The
Court rejected the control group standard as unworkable, primarily because of
a lack of uniform application and the difficulty of predicting which employees
would be found to be members of the control group. See generally Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go After
Upjohn?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 665 (1983) (describing the origin of the control
group test and cataloguing decisions adopting it).
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11. IN RE SEALED CASE
In May, 1993, seven longtime employees of the White
House travel office were fired, ostensibly over concerns of
"serious financial mismanagement."89 A subsequent congres-
sional review of the firings uncovered evidence that ultimately
led Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr to subpoena notes of a
conversation between Vincent Foster and his private attorney.90 A
federal district court granted a motion to quash the subpoena,
holding that the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine shielded the communications.9 In In re Sealed Case,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's decision to shield the notes from subpoena, stating
that the attorney-client privilege may not always apply after a
client's death.92 In doing so, the Court of Appeals did not sweep
away post-mortem privilege entirely. Rather, the court created
a new, limited exception to the traditional rule, guided by the
principle that a court mapping the contours of an evidentiary
privilege should attempt to "maximize the sum of the benefits
of confidential communications... and those of finding the
truth through our judicial processes. ""
The court began its reexamination of the post-mortem rule
by noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 50194 invites courts to
continue to shape and refine privilege law "in the light of reason
and experience."" Thus, opined the court, "where precedents
are in conflict or not controlling,"6 federal courts should "find
answers that best balance the purposes of the relevant doc-
trines." 7 The court then observed that the post-mortem rule,
though long-standing, has been kept alive largely through
nominal recognition by courts applying the testamentary ex-
ception to the privilege.98 Courts have rarely been called upon
89. See Isikoff & Hosenball, supra note 6, at 17.
90. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also su-
pra text accompanying notes 1-14 (describing the circumstances leading to the
investigation and subpoena).
91 See 124 F.3d at 231.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
94. See supra note 20 (discussing Rule 501 and its role in federal courts).
95. FED. R. EviD. 501.
96. 124 F.3d at 231.
97. Id.
98. See id.
1998] 1345
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to actually protect communications made by a now-deceased
client, and the relatively few decisions that have "manifest[ed]
the posthumous force of the privilege" read as mechanical ap-
plications of a prepackaged rule, offering little in the way of
principled reasoning. 9 Finally, the court noted that legal scholars,
including most top evidence scholars, have historically criticized
the strict prohibition on post-mortem disclosure, and
"have... generally supported some measure of post-death cur-
tailment [of the privilege]."'0°
Weighing the costs versus the benefits of protecting client
disclosures after death, the court determined that the communi-
cations at issue fell within a "discrete realm" in which the chilling
effect of abrogating the privilege would be minimal, and the
benefits of disclosure great."0 ' The court first explained its rea-
soning behind the "minimal chilling effect," asserting at the out-
set that "post-death revelation will typically trouble the client
less than pre-death revelation." 2 The court then identified
three potential concerns: civil liability, criminal liability, and
reputational concerns. 03 By confining its new exception to the
realm of criminal liability, the court eliminated the first concern
altogether."° The other two concerns, the court reasoned, would
pose a "modest" threat at most, because a dead person cannot be
held criminally liable, and is not affected by reputational con-
cerns."5 While a living client may be concerned with "the value
of [his or her] posthumous reputation simpliciter," 6 or may wish
to avoid exposing surviving family members to financial or repu-
tational harm, the court concluded that these "residual interests"
are not likely to enter into one's mind "[iun the sort of high-
adrenaline situation likely to provoke consultation with counsel"'0 7
The court then discussed the heightened costs of maintaining
confidentiality after the death of a client. Shielding communi-
cations from the eyes of the factfinder can exact a high cost,
99. Id. at 231-32.
100. Id. at 231. The court noted the "one distinguished exception," Wig-
more, who "proclaimed that there was 'no limit of time beyond which the dis-
closures might not be used to the detriment of the client or his estate.' Id.
10L See id. at 234.
102. Id. at 233.
103. See id.
104. See 1d.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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noted the court, particularly when the evidence is unavailable
through other reliable means. ' In the case of a living client,
the attorney-client privilege does not normally block access to
the truth, because the factfinder retains direct access to the in-
formation via the client.' After a client's death, however, the
net cost of maintaining confidentiality rises drastically, be-
cause the privilege now prevents access to what is often the
sole remaining source of the information formerly possessed by
the client, namely the client's attorney.110 Thus, concluded the
court, given the low risk of a chilling effect on client communica-
tions, and the high risk of jeopardizing the truthfmnding function,
certain circumstances may justify abrogation of the privilege."'
The court next announced its adoption of a new, case-by-
case balancing approach,"' defined by the following criteria:
Statements made by a now-dead client, which would otherwise be
protected by the attorney-client privilege, are admissible if they
bear on a significant aspect of a criminal investigation, pro-
vided there is a scarcity of reliable alternative sources of evi-
dence."' The court then ordered the district court to reexamine
the subpoenaed documents in light of this new balancing test."4
III. HONEY, I SHRUNK THE ATORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE: MINIMIZING THE RISKS POSED BY
COMPELLING DISCLOSURE
A. THE COURT IN SEALED CASE ACCORDED REPUTATIONAL
INTRESTS Too LirTLE WEIGHT
The court recognized that disclosure of clients' confidences
might, in addition to raising issues of criminal and civil liability,
108. See id. at 233-34.
109. The court noted that "[the client's] availability has been convention-
ally invoked as an explanation of why the privilege only slightly impairs ac-
cess to the truth." Id. at 234.
110. See id. at 233-34.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 234.
113. See id. at 235. The court's stated purpose in narrowing its new ex-
ception this way was to confine its application "only to communications whose
relative importance is substantial." Id. The opinion suggested that courts
implementing this exception require an initial showing of facts supporting a
reasonable belief that the communications would qualify for the exception,
and then review the materials in camera to decide whether to compel disclo-
sure. See 1d.
114. See 1d. at 237.
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implicate reputational concerns."' Its hasty dismissal of those
concerns lies at the core of the court's errant formulation of its
balancing test.
Identifying two "residual" aspects of one's post-death repu-
tation that might concern a living client, concern for one's sur-
viving family and the value of one's "posthumous reputation
simpliciter," the court posited that these interests are unlikely
to affect client disclosures,"6 especially "[i]n the sort of high-
adrenaline situation likely to provoke consultation with counsel.""'
Undoubtedly, excitement and the accompanying rush of
adrenaline may make clients less likely to carefully weigh the
consequences of their words and actions, thus lessening the
probability that they will take into account potential negative
consequences of disclosing information to their attorneys.18
There are two problems with the court's analysis, however.
Despite the court's contrary supposition, it is not necessarily
the case that the majority of attorney-client conversations take
place in the heat of some embattled controversy. A variety of
lawyer-client consultations take place in relaxed, colloquial
settings. It is sensible to suppose that some clients who approach
attorneys in these circumstances will have weighed all of the
potential benefits and costs-including the risk that the con-
tent of one's conversations with an attorney will later be re-
vealed-prior to seeking legal advice. These clients might well
be deterred by the risk of reputational harm.
On the other end of the spectrum are those clients who are
driven to consult with attorneys in order to avoid personal or
financial ruin, criminal liability, or some similar cataclysmic
fate. Of these clients, the most excited are often those whose
conduct is particularly embarrassing or horrific, and who thus
have the most compelling reasons to maintain the confidentiality
their communications." 9 In other words, the same factors that
induce panic and excitement--and a corresponding greater
115. See 124 F.3d at 233.
116. See id. The court noted that "[t]o the extent that concern over repu-
tation arises from an interest in the sort of treatment a person will receive
from others ... it ends with death." Id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See Frankel, supra note 16, at 60 (noting that "most of the cases
where [the post-mortem] privilege issue has been litigated (outside of the tes-
tamentary context) involve some pretty ghastly topics of communication be-
tween client and lawyer").
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likelihood that a client will become "caught up in the moment"
and disregard the risk of future disclosure-also correspond
with a higher likelihood that the client will have a strong motive
to avoid public disclosure.2 Thus, the court's own argument
for discounting reputational concerns in these types of cases
militates for the strongest possible protection of confidentiality.
Admittedly, it is one thing to state that reputational concerns
might affect some clients' willingness to disclose, and quite an-
other to conclude that a majority of clients actively calculate
and weigh the risk of post-death revelation when consulting
with attorneys. Given the underlying utilitarian rationale for
the attorney-client privilege, though, any potential threat to
client candor posed by an exception to the privilege is problem-
atic, because an exception is only justifiable if it offers a net
benefit to the truthfinding process. Balancing tests that weigh
the risks versus the benefits of disclosure are exceedingly diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to evaluate under this regime, because
the actual risk posed by the revelation of client confidences is
difficult to measure. 2' Research into the chilling effect of abro-
gating the attorney-client privilege has not yielded quantifiable
answers,12 and too many types of clients and legal problems
exist to accurately generalize about the extent of the threat.
Each client is an individual, possessing unique personality
traits, idiosyncrasies, and legal needs that shape interactions
with his or her attorney. For some clients, even a widespread,
absolute repeal of post-mortem privilege would do little to
dampen disclosure. Others might zealously safeguard the most
benign information even when assured of eternal confidentiality.
This is not to suggest that courts should never create ex-
ceptions to the attorney-client privilege. Rather, the difficulty
of ascertaining empirically the chilling effect caused by a given
exception imposes a duty on courts to use whatever means
available to minimi e the risk of deterring client candor. The
court in Sealed Case failed to recognize that reputational inter-
120. Even without this reasoning, it is difficult to justify an exception to
the privilege on the basis of a clients hotheadedness or imprudence alone-
why not establish an exception for any information a client reveals to an at-
torney while in a state of intoxication? After all, the client in such circum-
stances is unlikely to be chilled by the risk of later revelation.
121 See sources cited supra note 56 (discussing the difficulty of determin-
ing the deterrent effect of abolishing the privilege).
122. See supra note 56.
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ests will often influence client decisionmaking, and crafted a
legal standard that unnecessarily disregards those interests.
B. THE SEALED CASE BALANCING TEST DOES NOT CONTAIN
THE SAFEGUARDS FOUND IN EXISTING EXCEPTIONS
TO THE PRIVILEGE THAT MINIMIZE THE RISK
OF HARM TO THE TRUTHFINDING PROCESS
A court crafting an exception to the attorney-client privi-
lege should attempt to minimize the risks of interrupting the
normal flow of attorney-client communications. The surest
way to do this is to fashion exceptions in such a way that the
client retains some control over the release of the information.
Even if the client cannot directly control the application of an
exception, a predictable exception should be favored over an
ambiguous one, in order to allow clients to anticipate with
some certainty situations in which it will apply. Alternately,
an exception might be designed to apply only to information
falling outside of the scope of the attorney-client relationship.3
Existing exceptions to the attorney-client privilege gener-
ally contain one or more of these safeguards. The most obvious
example is waiver by the client, in which the client must consent
to abrogation of the privilege. 4 Likewise, in the testamentary
context, the deceased "controls" the operation of the exception
through the very act of arranging for post-mortem distribution
of assets." Communications revealed in such a case simply ef-
fectuate the deceased client's previously expressed wishes.26
The crime-fraud exception applies in cases in which no rela-
tionship existed, at least with respect to the conversations at
issue, and thus does not threaten legitimate attorney-client
communications. Similarly, the "governmental entity" exception
123. Though this type of "exception" might deter client candor about cer-
tain matters, it does not deter legitimate attorney-client communications, and
thus does not threaten the attorney-client relationship. See supra notes 67-68
and accompanying text (noting that the privilege does not apply to communi-
cations made in furtherance of crime or fraud).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63 (discussing waiver).
125. See Frankel, supra note 16, at 76.
'126. The court in Sealed Case, positing that the testamentary exception
does not always reflect the decedent's intent, offered the example of a client who
"might want to provide for an illegitimate child but at the same time... [might]
prefer that the relationship go undisclosed." 124 F.3d at 234. The court
overlooked the possibility that such a client could maintain the secrecy of the
relationship by transferring assets to the child via nontestamentary means
such as a gift or an irrevocable trust.
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reflects the idea that it is not the role of government attorneys
to render private legal counsel to government employees with
regard to criminal activity.' By formulating exceptions to the
privilege in ways that allow clients to control or predict when
their communications will be disclosed,'2 courts have minimized
the risk of hindering frank disclosure by clients.
Unlike existing exceptions to the privilege, the balancing
test birthed in Sealed Case contains inadequate safeguards
and invites unpredictable application by courts. It thus poses a
significant threat to the truthfinding process.
The court confined the reach of its new exception to crimi-
nal proceedings, 29 reasoning that criminal liability-along with
the accompanying deterrent effect caused by the threat of
criminal sanctions-ends at death.'30 This safeguard would be
a powerful one if it functioned to limit the content of admissible
information to that implicating the deceased in criminal conduct.
Intuitively, society might feel more comfortable with a rule
that essentially limited its reach to criminals; if nothing else,
such a limitation would narrow the field of potential clients to
whom the exception might apply. It would also ensure some
measure of predictability, since a client would know which in-
formation might be disclosed after his or her death.
The problem with the court's new exception is that it contains
no such limitation. The Sealed Case balancing test allows for
anyone's communications-including those of an innocent third
party-to be revealed, so long as the communications at issue
are of "substantial" importance to the outcome of some criminal
proceeding.' Under the court's formulation, the deceased client
127. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86 (explaining the circum-
stances under which this exception applies).
128. Two of the existing exceptions cannot be qualified in this way. The
attorney self-defense exception, at least when it operates in suits brought by
third parties, may compel disclosure of legitimately privileged information
regardless of the client's wishes. Similarly, in the constitutional context, a
criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses may compel the disclosure of
otherwise legitimately privileged information. If there is anything to be said
for these exceptions, it is that the client will nearly always be on notice of the
potential for their application.
129. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 233.
130. See id.
131. The court did allow for the possibility of limiting access to the com-
munications "[tlo the extent that the [reviewing] court finds an interest in
confidentiality," and provided that a court "may in appropriate circumstances
protect innocent third parties from disclosure." Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 235
& n.6. This discourages, but does not preclude, the possibility that communi-
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might even be the victim of the very crime at issue, forced to
posthumously (and, potentially, publicly) cough up exceedingly
personal details in order to aid the government's investigation.
This result would run counter to notions of fairness. Moreover,
the potentially sweeping applicability of the court's exception
renders futile any effort to predict when it will apply.
The other limitation built into the court's new balancing
test-that the communications sought "bear on a significant
aspect of the crimes at issue"'--is similarly flawed. While it
seems at first glance a prudent limitation, the wording of this
portion of the exception has the potential to result in varied
application of the rule, because it gives little guidance as to the
meaning of the term "significant." "Significant" could mean
"indispensable to the case," or "more likely than not to result in
the solving of the crime, whereas without the communications
the crime would probably go unpunished," or even "relevant to
an important aspect of the case."
The court's use of the term begs this question: Must the
government, in order to invoke the exception, assert that the
communications are a necessary part of its case (that without
the evidence the case will fail), or need it only show some lesser
degree of relevance?' If other courts adopt the Sealed Case
balancing test, they will have to answer this question some-
how. By failing to specify what it meant by "significant," the
court invited varying interpretations of the term, and de-
creased the probability that clients will be able to predict with
any certainty the circumstances in which the exception will
apply. This lack of certainty, coupled with the risk of harm to
cations made by such a third party might be revealed.
132. Id. at 235.
133. A hypothetical is illustrative. Suppose that two deceased persons,
prior to dying, each communicated information to their attorney that the gov-
ernment now seeks to discover in order to further a criminal investigation
into a minor crime. One of the deceased persons was a career criminal and
the defendant's partner in crime. Disclosure of his communications would
almost certainly result in a favorable disposition of the government's case.
The other deceased person took no part in the crime, and did not know the
defendant. Her communications would probably aid the government's case,
but would not alone be dispositive. Further, revelation of her communications
would be extremely damaging, financially and reputationally, to her surviving
family. Under the Sealed Case balancing test, a court in this case would not
be required to weigh the potential damage to the latter party against the
benefit of obtaining a conviction, and would not be required to limit the appli-
cation of the exception to the former party's communications, despite the fact
that the former party had much more reason to expect his personal affairs to
become public, and would suffer less from the disclosure.
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third parties posed by the court's new exception, militates in
favor of an alternate legal rule.
IV. A NEW APPROACH: THE "CONSPIRACY" EXCEPTION
The facts of Sealed Case offer an ideal vehicle for reexam-
ining the scope of post-mortem privilege. Vincent Foster's close
ties to the Clintons and to the business of running the White
House'3 involved him directly in the events leading up to the
travel office firings, and most likely in the firings themselves.35
While tragic, Foster's death did cut off access to probably the
single most important source of evidence in the high-profile
criminal investigation into Mrs. Clinton's role in the affair. •
The court was thus probably justified, on the facts of Sealed
Case, in admitting the notes of Foster's conversations. It based
its decision to do so, however, on the wrong reasons, and ulti-
mately cast too wide a net into the sea of client communications.
Other courts should adopt a narrower and more principled formu-
lation of the post-mortem exception. This new exception would
abrogate the privilege in the following circumstances:
(1) after the death of a client,
(2) communications previously made by the client to an
attorney, which would otherwise be privileged,
(3) may be admissible as evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing
(4) upon a sufficient showing of probable conspiracy 136
involving the decedent client and the subject(s) of a
criminal investigation for which the evidence is now
needed,
(5) provided the crime that provoked the investigation
was part of the conspiracy,
(6) and provided the communications are necessary to
the resolution of the investigation.
This "conspiracy" exception to post-mortem privilege would op-
erate in situations similar to that involved in Sealed Case,'37
134. See generally Isikoff & Hosenball, supra note 6 (explaining the posi-
tion of Vince Foster in the White House).
135. See id. at 7.
136. The crime of conspiracy generally requires an agreement between at
least two parties to commit an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4, at 525
(2d ed. 1986).
137. The communications at issue in Sealed Case may or may not have led
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while avoiding the pitfalls associated with unfair and vague
balancing tests.
Procedurally, operation of the conspiracy exception would
mirror that of the crime-fraud exception,' and by extension,
that of the Sealed Case balancing test.'39 In order to invoke the
conspiracy exception, the state would be required to make an
initial showing of a probable conspiracy. To ensure that legiti-
mately privileged conversations remained shielded from dis-
covery, courts could review the communications in camera
when evaluating prosecutors' requests to compel disclosure. 40
The communications at issue could serve as the basis for invoking
the exception,'4' but only if the state introduced independent
evidence supporting a reasonable belief that in camera review
of those communications would lead to a showing of probable
conspiracy.142
By allowing compelled disclosure only in cases in which
the communications sought were truly necessary to the conduct
of the state's investigation, the conspiracy exception would
limit the discretionary authority of the reviewing court, resulting
in more predictable application. Imposing this standard would
not eliminate discretion entirely; any inquiry into the
"necessity" of providing the state access to privileged communi-
cations will ultimately require a subjective evaluation by the
reviewing judge. What matters is that this "necessity" hurdle,
by precluding compelled disclosure in cases in which the state
is able to resolve its case by other means, improves upon the
"substantial relative importance" prong of the Sealed Case bal-
to the successful invocation of the conspiracy exception. This Comment is not
meant to imply that Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Foster conspired to commit any
crime. Rather, given the criminal investigation into Mrs. Clintons role in the
travel office firings, it argues that the Independent Counsel should have been
required to show that Foster was involved in the alleged wrongdoing-and
that the communications sought were necessary to the investigation of Mrs.
Clinton-before gaining access to Foster's conversations.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 64-72 (discussing the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege). In cases in which the decedent
conspirator had sought or used legal advice in furtherance of the crime, the
crime-fraud exception itself would render the privilege inapplicable.
139. The court in Sealed Case prescribed the use of the same procedural
mechanisms for its balancing test. See 124 F.3d at 235; see also supra note
113 (explaining how this scheme would apply to the Sealed Case balancing
test).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72 (describing the evidentiary
showing needed to invoke the crime-fraud exception).
14L See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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ancing test." Under the latter formulation, a court would be
required to take into account the necessity of the evidence, but
depending on how it interpreted the concept of "substantial
importance,"1" might compel disclosure of communications in
some instances notwithstanding the existence of alternate
means of resolving the case. 45
The conspiracy exception, by confining its scope to com-
munications made by parties to the conspiracy, would also
avoid the revelation of embarrassing or damaging information
to the detriment of innocent third parties.'" This not only reduces
the risk of deterring frank communications by law-abiding cli-
ents, it lessens the danger of undermining public confidence in
the judiciary.147 Only a person who had had some stake in the
criminal enterprise while alive would be subject to the threat of
disclosure.
Confining the exception to communications made by con-
spirators is not a panacea. Under the utilitarian rationale, the
need for a well-grounded expectation of confidentiality applies
with equal force to criminal conspirators as it does to innocent
third parties. However, this limitation would allow clients to
predict with much greater certainty whether their communica-
tions were likely to become the subject of a request for disclosure.
The vast, law-abiding majority of clients could consult with
their attorneys free from the threat of disclosure. Conversely,
potential conspirators would be on notice of the risk that their
criminal compatriots' communications might be used against
them.'" Thus, it is not only a fairer means of promoting the reso-
143. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (describing the bal-
ancing test).
144. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text (noting the range of
possible interpretations).
145. The court in Sealed Case, likely envisioning its exception operating in
similar fashion, indicated that "[wihere there is an abundance of disinterested
witnesses with unimpaired opportunities to perceive and unimpaired memory,
there would normally be little basis for intrusion on the intended confidential-
ity." 124 F.3d at 235. The conspiracy exception, though, requires, rather than
recommends, that courts refrain from compelling disclosure unless there is no
alternative means of resolving the case.
146. The court in Sealed Case did not ignore the danger of harm to third
parties, but did not entirely preclude the possibility. See supra note 131.
147. In strict utilitarian terms, this latter argument is of little relevance.
However, an alternative rationale for the privilege is to promote public confi-
dence in the court system. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
148. To the extent that would-be criminals plan their capers according to a
rational cost-benefit analysis, the rule would thus tend to discourage group
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lution of criminal investigations, but a more predictable legal
standard as well.
CONCLUSION
The attorney-client privilege serves the needs of the legal
system by ensuring that clients are willing to disclose infor-
mation to their attorneys, thus improving the accuracy of the
adversarial process. Courts have carved out exceptions to the
privilege to allow for disclosure when doing so serves the cli-
ent's interests, or when the information sought is not related to
the provision of legal services. The court in In re Sealed Case
established a new exception to the attorney-client privilege by
holding that after the death of a client, an attorney may be
compelled to disclose client communications if they are related
to a significant aspect of a criminal investigation. Though the
court acknowledged that courts have a duty to minimize the
deterrent effect of exceptions to evidentiary privileges, it failed
to recognize that its formulation could result in disclosure in
an unnecessarily broad range of circumstances without the
slightest warning to clients. An alternative formulation of the
Sealed Case balancing test, predicated on the existence of a
conspiracy between the decedent client and the object of the
criminal investigation, would provide prosecutors with access
to communications in appropriate cases while minimizing the
threat to the truthfinding process.
criminality, which is generally more dangerous and destructive than crimes
committed by individuals. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 136, § 6.4, at 530.
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